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Race, Xenophobia, and Punitiveness Among the American Public

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ABSTRACT

We outline four connections between xenophobia and punitiveness toward criminals in a national sample of Americans.

KEYWORDS

Xenophobia; immigrants; racial threat; racial animus; punitiveness; Donald Trump

Introduction

When Donald Trump sailed down an escalator at Trump Towers in Manhattan and announced his candidacy for President of the United States with a long, extemporaneous speech, his opening, defamatory remarks about immigrants received the most media coverage:

When do we beat Mexico at the border? They're laughing at us, at our stupidity. And now they are beating us economically. They are not our friend, believe me. But they're killing us economically. The U.S. has become a dumping ground for everybody else's problems. [applause] Thank you. It's true. And these are the best and the finest. When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. They're not sending you [pointing to crowd]. They're not sending you. They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people... It's coming from more than Mexico. It's coming from all over South and Latin America, and it's coming probably probably from the Middle East. But we don't know. Because we have no protection and we have no competence. We don't know what's happening. And it's got to stop and it's got to stop fast.¹

While the media noted that Trump's characterization of immigrants clearly traded in broad, negative stereotypes, his sweeping condemnation of outsiders struck a chord with Republican primary and general election voters (Whitehead, Perry, and Baker 2018), with

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support from substantial shares of older white voters in swing states in the Sun Belt (Florida and North Carolina) and Rust Belt (Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin) (Frey 2016).

Accompanying his xenophobic stance toward foreigners, Trump's campaign promised a wide range of punitive actions not only against standard rhetorical outsiders such as terrorists and criminals, but also against immigrants, refugees, and Muslims. The popularity of Trump's message and his electoral victories highlight the importance of understanding the connections between xenophobia and punitiveness, particularly among white Americans. Building on theories of racial threat and empirical studies of racial animus and punitiveness, we examine patterns of punitiveness in relation to xenophobia, a more generalized construct than specific forms of racial and ethnic animus, with potentially more useful measures.

Racial threat, animus, and punitiveness

Hegemonic social groups—such as white elites and the middle and upper class in Western countries—often identify racial and ethnic minorities as “social threats.” Racial threat theory proposes that social control is wielded by powerful groups in response to perceived threats to their collective interests (Liska 1992). When hegemonic white groups perceive non-whites as competition for scarce resources and threats to the power and privileges their social groups enjoy, they (either explicitly or implicitly) display discriminatory behavior, leading to structural inequalities (Blalock 1967). As initially posited, racial threat theory proposes macro, structural explanations for differential levels of social control directed toward minorities in specific spatial areas. Accordingly, research testing the theory has primarily focused on the relationship between macro demographic predictors, such as the size of and changes to minority populations, and forms of social control, such as rates of arrest for minorities (Parker, Stults, and Rice 2005), the use of police force (Chamlin 1989; Jacobs and O'Brien 1998), and enforcing capital punishment (Jacobs and Carmichael 2002).

While originally posited to explain macro level patterns of social conflict, racial threat theory also provides a useful framework for examining and understanding social psychological patterns of racial prejudice and punitiveness, as fear is the precursor to prejudice (Stephan and Stephan 2000). Further, Blalock's (1967:29) theory explicitly posited *fear* of minority threats as the link between macro level sociodemographic patterns and the motivations for enacting punitive social policies. Integrating these two levels of analysis, researchers have shown that changes to demographic patterns can result in increased perceptions of threat among the public (Quillian 1995). However, while the population dynamics of minority groups and the perceived threat of minorities are related, they have also been shown to exert independent and interactive effects on punitive ideology at the individual level (King and Wheelock 2007; Stewart et al. 2015).

For instance, demonstrating the potentially complex relationship between population dynamics and public perceptions of threat, Hispanic Americans have been found to be perceived as more threatening where their population numbers are both scarce (Welch et al. 2011) and prevalent (Eitle and Taylor 2008). Importantly then, perceptions of social threat are not wholly dependent on residential proximity or population size, as the conflation of race and crime exists even in homogeneous and hegemonic residency areas (Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz 2004). In terms of magnitude, when examined together, *perceived* threat has

been found to have a stronger relationship to support for punitive policies than population dynamics (Chiricos et al. 2014; King and Wheelock 2007; Wang 2012).

Perceived threats from outgroups may be cultural, economic, or criminal in orientation (Chiricos et al. 2014). Cross-cultural research has shown increased support for punitiveness particularly when minorities are perceived as an economic threat (Wheelock, Semukhina, and Demidov 2011). Accordingly, changes to unemployment rates and the size of minority populations can trigger the desire to punish among whites who perceive minorities as strains on material resources (Stewart et al. 2015). Another important dimension of the link between perceived threat and punitiveness is when outgroups are stereotyped as more criminal, as such views have been shown to be a strong and consistent predictor of punitive attitudes (Barkan and Cohn 2005; Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz 2004; Pickett et al. 2014; Stewart et al. 2015; Stupi, Chiricos, and Gertz 2016; Welch 2016; Welch et al. 2011). Similar to studies of perceived threat, empirical research has shown consistent, cross-cultural evidence linking animus against specific minority groups to support for harsh criminal justice policies (Barkan and Cohn 2005; Unnever and Cullen 2007, 2010a, 2010b). Although hardly a novel strategy (see Mendelberg 1997), Donald Trump's rhetoric and electoral success reiterates that these patterns of public punitiveness provide ample opportunity for exploitation by opportunistic politicians who can denigrate minority groups as having "no place in our society" in order to portray themselves "protectors" (Unnever and Cullen 2010a:852).

Xenophobia and punitiveness

Nearly all of the empirical research on racial animus and punitiveness operationalizes minority threat perception by asking about specific racial or ethnic groups (for an exception, see Chiricos et al. 2014); however, the broader concept of xenophobia may offer a better way of examining perceptions of minority threat by measuring outgroup animus without forcing individuals to identify as overtly racist toward specific targets, which is significantly influenced by social desirability bias (Krumpal 2012).

Importantly, racism and xenophobia are related but conceptually distinct phenomena (Bernasconi 2014; Sundstrom and Kim 2014; Wimmer 1997). Racism reflects nationalized narratives and a "social/historical structure and a set of accumulated signifiers" (Omi and Winant 2015:125), often devolving, at least in Western societies, to the binary difference between black and white (Sundstrom and Kim 2014). Whereas racism focuses on physical characteristics to identify a specific outgroup that is deemed inferior, xenophobia focuses more on a sense of fear of the unknown and of a generalized outgroup which exists outside the community (UNESCO n.d.). Thus, the differences between racism and xenophobia can be understood in terms of hierarchization, as racism implies outgroups can be ranked, while xenophobia identifies a generalized outgroup without rankings beyond a "them vs. us" dichotomy (Wimmer 1997). As a result, xenophobia and racism can be placed on a continuum of increasingly exclusive discourses. So although racism and xenophobia are clearly related—racists will also tend to be xenophobes, but less likely the inverse²—there is a conceptual difference between a generalized distrust of those-who-are-not-us and devaluations of more specific groups identified by physical characteristics.

While distinct, there are also, of course, many similarities between racism and xenophobia. Like racism, xenophobic beliefs are stereotyped understandings of particular categories of people based on erroneous inference biases, which are used as shortcuts for quickly reading daily interactions (Rydgren 2004). Also like racism, “essentialism” is a primary tool for implementing exclusion, as beliefs about perceived essential differences provide the foundation for dehumanization and demonization (Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz 2004:379). Ultimately it is best to understand xenophobia and racism as related, but distinct, social phenomena.

Hypotheses

So what place should xenophobia have in broader theories about and assessments of racial threat, animus, and punitiveness? To answer this general research question, we test four specific hypotheses about the connections between xenophobia and punitive ideology using a national sample of Americans.

H₁: Xenophobia will be a stronger predictor of punitiveness than more specific forms of racial animus among self-identified whites.

H₂: Xenophobia will be a stronger predictor of punitiveness among self-identified whites than among self-identified racial minorities.

H₃: Xenophobia will significantly mediate the relationships between sociodemographic, political, and religious characteristics and punitiveness among self-identified whites.

H₄: Xenophobia will be the strongest overall predictor of punitiveness among self-identified whites.

Data

We test these hypotheses by analyzing data from Wave I of the Chapman Survey of American Fears, which was collected in April of 2014. The survey was developed with the intent of assessing a wide range of topics involving fear and anxiety, and also included standard sociodemographic, political, and religious questions. The data were collected by GfK (previously Knowledge Networks), drawing from its online KnowledgePanel pool of respondents. KnowledgePanel is a probability-based web panel initially generated through random digit phone dialing, then maintained using the Service Delivery Sequence File from the United States Postal Service, which includes households without telephone lines. GfK is a long-standing (founded in 1934) consumer research firm with expertise in probability samples. Based in Germany, GfK acquired Knowledge Networks in 2011.

The data were tailored to be representative of the adult population of the United States. Selected households were asked to participate in an online panel study. Households that agreed to participate but did not have the necessary equipment were provided a computer and internet connection in order to complete the survey. After being added to the panel pool, respondents are asked to participate in select surveys and given unique login

identifiers to access relevant surveys. In general, this mode of survey collection has been shown to be a reliable method for generating parametric national samples (see Baker et al. 2010; Chang and Krosnick 2009; Yeager et al. 2011). The completion of the survey in an online, anonymous mode also helped reduce desirability bias for questions on sensitive topics.

The 2014 Survey of American Fears was administered in English. GfK first administered a pre-test to 35 respondents to ensure that questions were clear and participants adequately understood the procedure. After the successful pre-test, 2,500 respondents were recruited from the panel to answer the questionnaire. Of the 2,500 recruited, 1,572 completed the survey.³

Measures

Dependent variable

The outcome of interest is an index of punitiveness based on a six-question battery with a prompt that read: “The criminal justice system should. . .” The specific items were: “Make sentences more severe for all crimes”; “Use the death penalty for juveniles who murder”; “Limit the appeals available for death sentences”; “Use ‘three strikes’ laws for repeat offenders”; “Use chemical castration on sex offenders”; and “Reduce the privileges available to prisoners (televisions, recreation, etc.)” Each question had answer choices coded from strongly disagree (0) to strongly agree (3), such that higher scores indicate greater punitiveness. A principal components factors analysis yielded a single factor with an Eigenvalue of 3.7 and all items loading at $\geq .745$. The index has a Cronbach’s $\alpha = .871$.

Primary independent variables

To test whether views of immigrants are more predictive of punitiveness than specific forms of racial animus (H_1), we use three “feeling thermometers,” which asked respondents to rate how they felt about specific groups of people on a scale from 0 to 100. We used feeling thermometer measures for “blacks,” “Hispanics,” and “immigrants” to predict the punitive ideology index among self-identified white respondents.

After this initial assessment, we turn to the primary predictor of interest, which is an index of xenophobia based on multiple indicators from a prompt that read: “Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements about immigrants.” The items in the battery of questions about xenophobia were designed to tap into fears regarding immigration among Americans. Researchers developing xenophobia scales for different countries or to be applied cross-nationally (e.g. Jolly and DiGiusto 2014; Van Der Veer et al. 2013, 2011) have emphasized that such measures should reflect commonly held fears regarding unknown others. The Chapman University survey team conducted small group interviews and reviewed news reports to identify key terms in American discourse on immigration. Though the items differ slightly, they are comparable to those used by Jolly and DiGiusto (2014) and Van Der Veer et al. (2011).

The six specific statements used to create the additive index of xenophobia were: “Recent immigrants are more reluctant to assimilate than previous immigrants”; “Immigrants are a drain on the economy”; “Immigrants bring diseases into the United

States”; “Immigrants are more likely to commit crime than U.S. citizens”; “Deportation is a good solution for immigration issues”; and “Creating a ‘pathway to citizenship’ will encourage illegal immigration.” Each question had answer choices coded from strongly disagree (0) to strongly agree (3), such that higher scores indicate greater xenophobia. A principal components factor analysis yielded a single factor with an Eigenvalue of 3.7 and all items loading at $\geq .730$. The index has a Cronbach’s $\alpha = .881$.⁴ Combined, these indicators provide a composite measure of xenophobia that incorporates perceptions of economic, cultural, and criminal threat from immigrants.⁵

Another predictor of interest is the self-identified race or ethnicity of respondents, which was coded into four mutually exclusive dummy variables for white, black, Hispanic, and mixed or “other” race. Whites are used as the reference category in multivariate analyses of the full sample. To test whether there are significant interaction effects between self-identified race/ethnicity and xenophobia for predicting punitiveness (H_2), we created three multiplicative terms for the xenophobia index and each of the self-identified racial/ethnic categories other than white.⁶ In models assessing these interactions, the lower order coefficient for xenophobia represents its slope on punitiveness among whites, while the interaction terms assess whether there are statistically significant differences in the slopes of xenophobia among each of the other racial and ethnic categories compared to whites (see Aiken and West 1991).

Control variables

We also use a number of control variables to account for factors that have been shown to predict punitiveness, including sociodemographic, political, and religious characteristics, as well as fear of crime, perceived safety, and viewing television shows about crime. Specifically, we account for sociodemographic factors shown to be important negative predictors of punitiveness, such as education level (King and Wheelock 2007), income (Stupi, Chiricos, and Gertz 2016), being currently employed (Stewart et al. 2015), and being a woman (Wang 2012), as well as factors found to have a positive relationship with punitiveness, such as age (Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz 2004), being married (Costelloe, Chiricos, and Gertz 2009), urban residence (Unnever and Cullen 2010b), and living in the South (Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz 2004; Unnever and Cullen 2007). Education was measured in degree categories, ranging from less than high school (1) to bachelor’s degree or higher (4). Annual personal income was measured in categories ranging from less than \$5,000 (1) to \$175,000 or more (19).⁷ Gender, marital status, and employment were coded as three separate dummy variables, such that women, those currently married, and those currently employed = 1. Age was measured in years, ranging from 18 to 92. Rural/urban status was coded as a dummy variable depending on whether a respondent’s location was classified by the Census Bureau as metro (1) or non-metro (0). Region of the country was coded into four dummy variables for South, Northeast, Midwest, and West based on Census designations. South is used as the reference category in multivariate models.

A consistent and strong predictor of punitive ideology is political identity, with conservatives averaging higher levels of punitiveness (Stupi, Chiricos, and Gertz 2016; Wang 2012). To account for this relationship we used a question that read: “How would you describe yourself politically?” Answer choices ranged from “extremely conservative” (1) to “extremely liberal” (7), with “moderate” (4) as the middle category.

Religion has also been shown to significantly predict punitiveness. Specifically, fundamentalist Protestant affiliation and beliefs increase punitiveness (King and Wheelock 2007). The strongest connection between religion and increased punitiveness has been found for belief in religious evil, with believers in such concepts as Satan and hell being much more punitive than non-believers (Baker and Booth 2016). Once these aspects of religious ideology are accounted for, higher levels of religious practice may reduce punitiveness. To account for the complex and potentially multivalent effects of religion on punitiveness, we included three religious control measures: 1) religious affiliation; 2) a belief orthodoxy index that includes fundamentalist views of the Bible and beliefs about religious evil; and 3) a measure of religious service attendance. Affiliation was coded into dummy variables for Protestant, Catholic, “other” Christian, Jewish, “other” religions, and no religion. Protestants are used as the reference category for multivariate models. The fundamentalist orthodoxy measure combined questions addressing biblical literalism, the belief that “Satan causes most evil in the world,” and the belief that “the world will end as prophesied in the Bible.” Stance on the Bible was measured on an ordinal scale from “The Bible is an ancient book of history and legends” (1) to “The Bible means what it says. It should be taken literally word-for-word on all subjects” (5). Belief that “Satan causes most evil” and that Armageddon is impending were measured from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (4), with higher scores indicating greater orthodoxy. The index had a Cronbach’s $\alpha = .73$.⁸ Religious service attendance was measured from “never” (1) to “several times a week” (8).

Individuals’ perceptions of their own safety (Chiricos, McEntire, and Gertz 2001) and fears about crime (Eitle and Taylor 2008) are also important aspects of punitiveness, particularly from the perspective of racial threat theory. To control for perceived safety, we created an index based on five questions that asked about how safe respondents felt in their homes at night, walking alone at night, in their neighborhoods, in their cities, and at their work or school. Answer choices were coded from “not safe at all” (1) to “very safe” (4). The index had a Cronbach’s $\alpha = .817$. For fear of crime, we created an index by combining nine questions from a battery that asked: “How afraid are you of being victimized in the following ways?” The specific questions were about being the victim of mugging, gang violence, identity theft, stalking, murder, police brutality, sexual assault, racial/hate crime, and mass public shootings. Answer choices were coded from “not afraid at all” (0) to “very afraid” (3). The fear of crime index had a Cronbach’s $\alpha = .928$.

Lastly, we included an index that assessed levels of viewing television in general, and shows about crime specifically, as the consumption of media about crime has been shown to predict attitudes about criminal punishment (Rosenberger and Callanan 2011). Respondents were asked how frequently they watched TV in general, “true” crime shows (such as *Dateline* or *America’s Most Wanted*), and fictional crime shows (such as *CSI* or *Law & Order*). Answer choices were coded from “never” (1) to “very often” (5). The TV viewing index had a Cronbach’s $\alpha = .676$.⁹

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in the study (other than the multiplicative interaction terms), as well as the bivariate correlation between each predictor and the punitive ideology index. Providing initial support for H_1 , for the feeling thermometer measures (among self-identified whites only), views of immigrants have the highest correlation with punitiveness ($r = -.38$), as well as a significantly lower overall mean score ($\bar{X} = 56.2$) compared to specific animus toward “blacks” ($r = -.23$; $\bar{X} = 68.3$)

Table 1. Descriptive statistics for variables used in study.

Variable	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	r with Punitiveness
Punitiveness	7.19	4.19	0	18	
Xenophobia	8.96	4.05	0	18	.446**
Blacks therm. ^a	68.32	24.12	0	100	.225***
Hispanics therm. ^a	65.54	25.85	0	100	.261***
Immigrants therm. ^a	56.21	28.53	0	100	.383***
White	0.66	0.47	0	1	.075**
Black	0.12	0.32	0	1	.127**
Hispanic	0.14	0.35	0	1	.038
Other/mixed race	0.06	0.24	0	1	.066*
Education	2.74	1.01	1	4	.140**
Income	11.89	4.52	1	19	.004
Gender	1.52	0.50	1	2	.047
Married	0.51	0.50	0	1	.048
Age	46.86	17.25	18	92	.109**
Employed	0.56	0.50	0	1	.051
Political liberalism	3.77	1.44	1	7	.288**
Urban	0.84	0.37	0	1	.020
South	0.37	0.48	0	1	.025
Northeast	0.18	0.39	0	1	.049
Midwest	0.22	0.41	0	1	.045
West	0.23	0.42	0	1	.030
Protestant	0.36	0.48	0	1	.083**
Catholic	0.23	0.42	0	1	.069**
Other Christian	0.12	0.33	0	1	.020
Jewish	0.02	0.14	0	1	.081**
Other religion	0.08	0.27	0	1	.037
No religion	0.18	0.39	0	1	.142**
Service attendance	3.94	2.48	1	8	.063*
Belief orthodoxy	4.85	2.85	0	10	.232**
Perceived safety	14.55	2.95	5	20	.072**
Fear crime	6.94	6.05	0	24	.111**
TV Crime Viewing	9.13	2.74	3	15	.130**

Source: 2014 Chapman Survey of American Fears

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

a: Descriptives among white respondents only

and “Hispanics” ($r = -.26$; $\bar{X} = 65.6$).¹⁰ Providing initial support for H_4 , the xenophobia index has by far the strongest correlation to punitiveness ($r = .45$) among the independent variables in the full sample, with political liberalism a distant second ($r = .29$).

Analytic strategy

We begin by comparing the relative power of feeling thermometers about “blacks,” “Hispanics,” and “immigrants” for predicting punitive ideology (H_1). Because two of the questions are about racial and ethnic minorities who comprise a substantial proportion of respondents to the survey, we conduct the comparative examination among self-identified white respondents only, so as not to bias the assessments against the measures of specific forms of racial animus compared to a non-racially specific view of “immigrants.” Table 2 presents OLS regression models using the index of punitiveness as the outcome. The models provide a test of the relative magnitude of the partial correlations between specific forms of racial animus compared to a more generalized xenophobia (or philia) for predicting punitiveness. We sequence the models such that each feeling thermometer is used independently first. This allows for comparisons of the size of the coefficients across

Table 2. OLS regressions predicting punitive attitudes by specific racial animus, views of immigrants, and xenophobia among whites (Unstandardized coefficients shown).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Racial Animus					
Blacks therm.	.022***			.014	.002
Hispanics therm.		.028***		.003	.008
Xenophobia					
Immigrants therm.			.039***	.044***	.022**
Xeno. Index					.381***
Sociodemographics					
Education	.517***	.458**	.441**	.423**	.222
Income	.031	.031	.039	.042	.017
Gender	.498	.516*	.421	.477	.359
Married	.209	.201	.178	.184	.201
Age	.002	.001	.001	.001	.007
Employed	.527	.524	.522	.498	.287
Political liberalism	.688***	.682***	.615***	.621***	.379***
Urban residence	.183	.160	.219	.218	.401
Northeast ^b	.389	.431	.323	.309	.392
Midwest ^b	.397	.366	.437	.462	.461
West ^b	.956**	.956**	.830*	.774*	.595
Religion					
Catholic ^c	.274	.247	.120	.054	.233
Other Christian ^c	.290	.234	.281	.286	.039
Jewish ^c	1.586	1.469	1.142	1.109	1.494
Other religion ^c	1.144	1.132	.876	.833	.586
No religion ^c	1.184**	1.126*	.997*	.943*	.752
Service attendance	.129	.118	.093	.101	.060
Belief orthodoxy	.232***	.235***	.198**	.197**	.115
Fear of Crime					
Perceived safety	.133**	.119	.111*	.116*	.122**
Fear of victimization	.056*	.051	.036	.034	.005
TV Viewing					
Crime shows index	.188***	.191***	.175***	.171***	.159***
Model Stats					
Constant	12.665	12.949	13.265	12.826	8.047
N	840	840	840	840	830
Adjusted R squared	.260	.271	.305	.305	.376

Source: 2014 Chapman Survey of American Fears

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

b: South is reference category

c: Protestants are reference category

the models. We then include all the feeling thermometer measures in the same model to see which ones remain significant predictors. Finally, we include all the feeling thermometer measures along with our primary multi-item xenophobia index to see how the composite measure compares to the single-item thermometer measures for immigrants and specific racial and ethnic groups.

After establishing the relative efficacy of the more comprehensive xenophobia index, we then assess the bivariate relationship between xenophobia and punitiveness for those who self-identify as different races and ethnicities using scatter plots fitted with Epanechnikov kernel density function LOESS lines. This provides an initial assessment of the interaction between racial/ethnic self-identification and xenophobia for predicting punitive ideology (H_2). We also assess whether there are significant differences in the correlations between xenophobia and punitiveness across racial and ethnic groups. Next, we staged OLS models predicting the punitive ideology index such that the first model includes the interactions of interest between race/ethnicity and xenophobia, the second model shows only the

controls without the xenophobia index or interaction terms, and the third model includes the xenophobia index, multiplicative interaction terms, and all controls. Models 1 and 3 in Table 4 provide a baseline and robust assessment of the hypothesized interactions (H_2), respectively. All variables were mean centered before entry into the models, with the exception of the xenophobia measure and multiplicative terms, for ease of graphically representing the results.

The changes in coefficients for the control variables between Models 2 and 3 in Table 4 provide an initial assessment of the potential mediating effects of xenophobia for social status characteristics and perceptions of crime and safety (H_3). We then offer a more rigorous analysis of these mediating effects by using PROCESS modeling developed by Hayes (2013), an expansion of earlier work by Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008). This method uses a bias-correcting bootstrapping technique to provide a direct assessment of mediating relationships, and has been shown to provide more accurate estimates of indirect effects than other analytic methods (Williams and MacKinnon 2008). We derived estimates of the mediating effects of xenophobia on punitiveness among white Americans using 5,000 bootstrapped samples. These models allow us to empirically assess the extent to which xenophobia is a cognitive mechanism linking social statuses to punitiveness among whites (H_3).

Finally, we present standardized coefficients—total (indirect and direct) effects for the controls and direct effect only for the xenophobia index—to evaluate the predictive strength of xenophobia relative to variables known to significantly influence punitive ideology among whites (H_4). This produces a conservative estimate of the strength of xenophobia compared to other predictors by accounting for the indirect effects of the controls, but not any potential indirect effects of xenophobia through other variables. This allows us to see if and to what extent xenophobia is the strongest predictor of punitiveness among white Americans, under empirical conditions favorable to other predictors.

Findings




Figure 1. Scatterplots of the relationship between xenophobia and punitiveness by self-identified race/ethnicity (with LOESS lines).

[REDACTED]

Table 3. Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations between xenophobia and punitiveness by self-identified race/ethnicity.

	Mean of Xeno	S.D. of Xeno	Mean of Punitive	S.D. of Punitive	r of Xeno. and Punitive
White	9.51	4.01	11.03	4.13	.542**
Black	8.31	3.42	9.31	4.02	.253**
Hispanic	7.32	4.23	10.43	4.16	.149*
"Other"/mixed races	8.03	3.98	11.77	4.50	.446**

Source: 2014 Chapman Survey of American Fears

* p < .05; ** p < .01

Note. Differences of correlations between white and black and between white and Hispanic are significant at .001 level (Fisher's r to z transformation)

Table 4. OLS regressions predicting punitive attitudes by xenophobia and self-identified race/ethnicity (Unstandardized coefficients shown).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Fear of Immigrants			
Xenophobia index	.555***		.449***
Race and Ethnicity			
Black ^a	1.277	2.190***	.891
Hispanic ^a	3.596***	.774*	3.215***
Other/mixed race ^a	2.138*	1.217**	2.664**
Interactions			
Black*xenophobia	.261**		.281**
Hispanic*xenophobia	.409***		.413***
Other race*xenophobia	.054		.091
Sociodemographics			
Education		.466***	.228
Income		.044	.020
Gender		.600**	.413*
Married		.174	.191
Age		.005	.003
Employed		.243	.184
Political liberalism		.675***	.357***
Urban residence		.651*	.689*
Northeast ^b		.427	.397
Midwest ^b		.474	.621*
West ^b		.479	.327
Religion			
Catholic ^c		.066	.081
Other Christian ^c		.210	.362
Jewish ^c		1.280	1.069
Other religion ^c		1.430**	1.138*
No religion ^c		.680	.270
Service attendance		.133*	.063
Belief orthodoxy		.221***	.145**
Fear of Crime			
Perceived safety		.091*	.053
Fear of victimization		.066**	.035
TV Viewing			
Crime shows index		.185***	.154***
Model Stats			
Constant	5.738	11.063	6.812
N	1407	1263	1242
Adjusted R squared	.235	.193	.296


Source: 2014 Chapman Survey of American Fears

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

a: Whites are reference category

b: South is reference category

c: Protestants are reference category



[REDACTED]




Figure 2. Punitive ideology by self-identified race/ethnicity and xenophobia.

[REDACTED]

Table 5. Mediation of significant predictors of punitive attitudes through xenophobia among whites.

	Direct Effect (b)	Indirect Effect (b)	Indirect/Total Ratio	β for Total Effect
Xenophobia	.449			.498
Education	.356	.317	.471	.162
Gender	.212	.219	.508	.052
Political liberalism	.376	.429	.533	.294
Attendance	.076	.112	.596	.113
Belief orthodoxy	.104	.118	.532	.152
Fear of victimization	.006	.060	1.111	.068

Source: 2014 Chapman Survey of American Fears
PROCESS Mediation Models (see Hayes 2013)

[REDACTED]

Discussion

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Conclusion

[REDACTED]

Notes

1. Quote is from authors' transcript of the speech. Full text of Trump's presidential announce ment speech is available at: <http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/>.
2. For instance, in the 2014 Chapman Survey of American Fears, among white respondents who rated "blacks" below 50 on the feeling thermometer, 78% also rated "immigrants" below 50. Conversely, of white respondents who rated "immigrants" below 50 on the feeling thermo meter, only 35% rated "blacks" below 50.
3. The sociodemographic frequencies in the Chapman Survey compare favorably to those from the 2014 General Social Survey. One area of difference was that the Chapman Survey has significantly more currently married respondents (58.9%) than the GSS (45.7%). Tabled results of the comparisons are available upon request.
4. Supplemental analyses with a xenophobia index weighted by factor loadings produced results identical to those presented.
5. We did not use a question from this battery about whether police should be allowed to conduct raids to find undocumented immigrants because of its similarity to the punitiveness outcomes. In support of the centrality of economic concerns in racial threat theory, the measure for whether "immigrants are a drain on the economy" had a stronger relationship to the punitive ideology outcome ($r = .498$) than the question about whether "immigrants are more likely to commit crime" ($r = .399$).
6. The xenophobia index had high reliability for scaling across the racial and ethnic categories. For black respondents, the items loaded on a single factor with an Eigenvalue of 3.5. For Hispanic and mixed race respondents there were single factors with Eigenvalues of 3.7 and 3.8, respectively.
7. 
8. We created this index of "belief orthodoxy" that included views of the Bible for consonance with previous research on punitiveness, but supplemental analyses examining the individual indicators (belief in an active Satan, belief in future Armageddon, and Bible views) showed that beliefs about Satan were more predictive of punitive ideology than beliefs about the Bible, Armageddon, or the overall orthodoxy index. This provides a replication of the recent finding that an important aspect of religiosity for predicting punitiveness is views of super natural evil (Baker and Booth 2016).
9. Due to the marginal reliability of the TV viewing index, we conducted supplementary analyses excluding this control. Focal results for the connections between xenophobia and punitiveness were unchanged. Among the specific indicators, punitiveness had the highest correlation with consuming "true crime" television shows.
10. $P < .001$ for paired samples T tests of the differences between mean scores on the "immi grants" thermometer compared to the thermometers for "blacks" and "Hispanics."
11. Z tests for significant differences of coefficients across Models 1-3 (see Paternoster et al. 1998) showed a statistically significant difference between the coefficients for "blacks" and "immigrants" ($Z = 2.40$; $p = .01$) and a marginally significant difference between the coefficients for "Hispanics" and "immigrants" ($Z = 1.60$; $p = .05$, one tailed tests).
12. The xenophobia index (VIF = 1.8) had a relatively low level of multicollinearity in this model. The feeling thermometer measures had elevated, but tolerable, levels of multicollinearity

(VIF = 2.6 for “blacks” and “Hispanics” thermometers; VIF = 3.0 for “immigrants” thermometer).

13. Quotations are from authors’ transcripts of both speeches. Textual transcripts are publically available for the nomination speech (<http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trump-nomination-acceptance-speech-at-rnc-225974>) and the immigration policy speech (<http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-donald-trump-immigration-speech-transcript-20160831-snap.htmlstory.html>).

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